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1  | INTRODUC TION
According to the impairment argument for the [im]morality of abortion,1 
abortion is immoral because it impairs a fetus to the n+1 degree, which 
in turn is wrong because it is also wrong to impair the fetus to the nth 
degree. For instance, it is wrong to cause a fetus to have fetal alcohol 
syndrome (FAS) by binge drinking during pregnancy (impairing the fetus 
to nth degree). Because such actions are wrong, it is thus also wrong to 
kill the fetus via abortion, as abortion impairs the fetus to the n+1 de-
gree: that is, it impairs the fetus to a greater degree than FAS does.
So, for the immorality of abortion, it does not matter whether 
or not the fetus is a person, nor does it matter whether or not it has 
a right to life—or so claims Perry Hendricks, an advocate of the im-
pairment argument. This response aims to show that there is reason 
to believe that, all things considered, the impairment argument is 
untenable and should be jettisoned.
2  | THE IMPAIRMENT ARGUMENT
The impairment argument has been framed as follows:
1. Causing an organism O to have FAS is immoral.
2. If causing O to have FAS is immoral then, ceteris paribus, killing O 
is immoral.
3. Therefore, killing O is immoral.
4. If one aborts O, then she kills O.
5. Therefore, to abort O is immoral.2
First, the good news: the argument is promising because it does not 
rely on the controversial metaphysical claim that we were once fe-
tuses,3 or that every fetus has a full moral status similar to that of 
1 Hendricks, P. (2019). Even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral: The 
impairment argument. Bioethics, 33(2), 245–253.
2 Hendricks, op. cit. note 1, p. 248. A slightly different way to formulate the argument is 
found in Hendricks, P. (2019). (Regrettably) abortion remains immoral: The impairment 
argument defended. Bioethics, 33(8), 968–969.
3 Pruss, A. (2011). I was once a fetus: That is why abortion is wrong. In S. Napier (Ed.), 
Persons, moral worth and embryos: A critical analysis of pro-choice arguments (pp. 19–42). 
Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer.
 
Received: 14 August 2019  |  Revised: 9 December 2019  |  Accepted: 18 December 2019
DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12720  
R E S P O N S E
Against the impairment argument: A reply to Hendricks
Joona Räsänen
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2020 The Author. Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Department of Philosophy, Classics, History 
of Art and Ideas, University of Oslo, Oslo, 
Norway
Correspondence
Joona Räsänen, Postboks 1020 Blindern 
0315 Oslo, Norway.
Email: joona.rasanen@ifikk.uio.no
Funding information
UiO Life Science Convergence Project: 
Epigenetics and bioethics of human 
embryonic development
Abstract
In an article of this journal, Perry Hendricks makes a novel argument for the immorality 
of abortion. According to his impairment argument, abortion is immoral because: (a) 
it is wrong to impair a fetus to the nth degree, such as causing the fetus to have fetal 
alcohol syndrome (FAS); (b) it is wrong to impair a fetus to the n+1 degree (to cause the 
fetus to be more impaired than to have FAS); (c) killing the fetus impairs the fetus to the 
n+1 degree (causes it to be more impaired than to have FAS); (d) abortion kills the fetus; 
(e) therefore, abortion is immoral. The impairment argument is a promising account for 
the wrongness of abortion because it does not rely on the controversial metaphysical 
premise that a fetus is a person. This article aims to show, that despite some immedi-
ate advantages over the rival theories of the immorality of abortion there is a reason 
to believe that the impairment argument is untenable. That is because there are goods 
that can be achieved by abortion but that cannot be achieved by impairing the fetus.
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someone reading (or writing) this paper.4 It simply relies on a quite 
common assumption that if it is wrong to cause something bad to hap-
pen, it is even worse, morally, to cause something worse to happen.5
There are several ways one could contest the impairment argu-
ment. For example, Bruce Blackshaw argues that killing does not impair 
the fetus the same way as impairing does.6 Dustin Crummet argues 
that the ceteris paribus clause of the impairment principle is not met in 
cases of pregnancy because carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term 
is much more burdensome than is refraining from excessive drinking 
for 9 months.7 Here, I will show that the ceteris paribus clause in the 
second premise of the argument is not met. Put another way: all things 
are not equal, as there are certain goods that cannot be achieved by 
impairing the fetus, but which can be achieved by killing it.8
To see the problem of the impairment principle, we can apply 
the argument to non-human animals as well. Many people believe it 
is wrong to impair animals. For example, it is wrong to blind a horse. 
If it is wrong to blind a horse, according to the argument, it is also 
wrong to kill a horse.9 But horses are often killed, for example, for 
food. If the impairment argument works, not only is it wrong to kill 
fetuses—it is also wrong to kill many non-human animals.10
Advocates of the impairment argument could contest my claim 
and argue the ceteris paribus clause is not met in the case of an an-
imal, but that it is met in the case of a fetus. Hendricks explains the 
ceteris paribus clause as follows:
If, for example, the impairment referred to in the conse-
quent produces a particularly valuable good, but the im-
pairment referred to in the antecedent does not produce 
such a good (or the good it produces is significantly less 
valuable), then the ceteris paribus clause is not met, and 
TIP [the impairment principle] does not kick in.11
For instance, one could claim that, by killing the aforementioned 
horse, there is a valuable good produced (its edible meat) that is not 
produced by blinding it, while there are no valuable goods that are 
achieved by killing the fetus that would not also be achieved by im-
pairing it.
However, there are two problems with this reasoning. First, if 
one would eat the fetus after killing it, then according to the argu-
ment, abortion would not be immoral, as there would then be an 
achievable good (the fetus’ edible meat) that would not be possible 
to achieve if the fetus were merely blinded. But surely, eating the 
fetus after killing it does not make abortion less wrong; on the con-
trary, it makes it worse.
Second, some goods can be achieved through abortion that cannot 
be achieved by impairing the fetus, thus the impairment principle fails.
3  | GOODS OF ABORTION
What goods can be achieved by abortion, but not by impairing the 
fetus with FAS? Hendricks briefly considers some possible goods, 
and finds them lacking. These are: the good of the woman’s auton-
omy, the good of not having to be an unwilling parent, and the good 
of not having a child.
I believe the most obvious good that comes from abortion is that 
the child that would otherwise exist does not exist. Some might be 
skeptical whether there is anything good about “non-existing.” Non-
existence does, however, provide several goods. Non-existence is 
good for (a) the non-existent entity itself, (b) its prospective parents, 
and (c) others (including animals, the environment, and fellow humans).
First, non-existence is good for the one who does not exist be-
cause she would avoid the pains she would otherwise inevitably suf-
fer in life if she were to exist.12 Abortion prevents someone from 
coming into existence (or kills them, depending on one’s view of 
when a fetus becomes a person), and that someone would inevitably 
suffer during her life. When a woman has an abortion, she prevents 
the pains and discomforts of life from befalling on the fetus (or fu-
ture person). Of course, abortion also prevents the happiness and 
many pleasures of life that the fetus (or future person) would have 
experienced if not aborted, but that is not relevant here. What is 
relevant is that the lack of pain and discomfort of the future person 
cannot be achieved by impairing the fetus.
Hendricks does not claim that the only option for the ceteris pa-
ribus clause not to be met is that the bad outweigh the good; he 
simply claims that it is enough to refute the argument that abortion 
can achieve some goods that impairment cannot.
Second, the death of the fetus is good for the prospective par-
ents because they would avoid the burdens of parenthood, such 
as losing sleep due to the infant crying at night. These cannot be 
achieved by impairing the fetus, for example, by giving it FAS. Again, 
surely there are goods of having a child that cannot be achieved 
by not having one, and in at least some (perhaps most) cases, the 
goods of being a parent outweigh the goods of not being a parent. 
Again, however, the point is not to compare the outcomes of being 
4 Kaczor, C. (2015). The ethics of abortion: Women’s rights, human life, and the question of 
justice (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.
5 Therefore, it also solves the abortion paradox by claiming that there is no paradox 
because abortion is immoral. The kernel of the abortion paradox is based on the three 
plausible assumptions: (a) abortion is permissible, (b) it is wrong to cause the fetus to be 
disabled, and (c) it is better for the fetus to be disabled than dead. But how can a morally 
wrong choice (causing the fetus to be disabled) be better than the permissible choice 
(killing the fetus)? For more about the paradox see McMahan, J. (2005). Paradoxes of 
abortion and prenatal injury. Ethics, 116, 625–655.
6 Blackshaw, B. P. (2019). The impairment argument for the immorality of abortion: A 
reply Bioethics, 33(6), 723–724; Blackshaw, B. P. (2020). The impairment argument for the 
immorality of abortion revisited. Bioethics, 34(2), 211–213.
7 Crummet, D. (2020). Violinists, demandingness, and the impairment argument against 
abortion. Bioethics, 34(2), 214–220.
8 For other goods that can only be achieved by abortion see: Pickard, C. (2020). Abortion 
is incommensurable with fetal alcohol syndrome. Bioethics, 34(2), 207–210.
9 Let us assume here that it is equally painless/painful for the horse to be blinded as it is 
to be killed.
10 This should not necessarily be understood as a reductio ad absurdum against the 
impairment argument, since many people believe killing animals is wrong.
11 Hendricks, op. cit. note 1, p. 247.
12 Benatar, D. (2006). Better never to have been. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
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vs. not being a parent, but simply to show that there are goods that 
can only be achieved by killing the fetus—not by impairing it.
One could object here that the goods of not producing a child 
can be achieved by adopting one instead, so abortion is not neces-
sary. Hendricks suggests this. While it is true that some of the goods 
of not having a child can be achieved by adoption (such as not losing 
sleep because of a crying infant), not all goods of not having a child 
can be achieved by adoption.
For example, in some rare cases, the genetic parents may well 
be required, morally, to do something demanding and harmful for 
themselves because of the well-being of the child. To understand 
this, consider the following problem by Jeff McMahan:
Sperm donor. A man donates sperm at a sperm bank, 
having signed an agreement that both guarantees him 
anonymity and absolves him of all responsibility for any 
child who might be conceived using his sperm. Later, 
however, a woman who has been artificially inseminated 
using the man’s sperm gives birth to a child with a serious 
medical condition. Only a bone marrow transplant can 
save its life. Desperate to find a suitable donor, the 
woman illegally obtains access to the records at the bank, 
discovers the identity of the sperm donor, and ap-
proaches him with a plea to donate bone marrow in order 
to save her child’s life.13
According to McMahan, many people intuitively believe that this 
biological relationship gives the sperm donor a special reason to pro-
vide bone marrow for the child, although it might not mean that the 
sperm donor is morally obligated to provide the bone marrow. It is only 
to say that he has a moral reason to provide it that someone completely 
unrelated to the child does not have. While the sperm donor might 
not have a moral obligation to donate the bone marrow, I believe it 
is safe to assume that he is at least obligated to consider the choice 
more seriously than would be expected from a total stranger. This 
moral reason to consider the donation does not disappear after the 
child is adopted away, but it does disappear when the child is killed as a 
fetus. Therefore, there is a good of not having a child that can only be 
achieved by an abortion, so the impairment argument fails.
One might object that in the above case, there is nothing that 
harms the parents, and avoiding the harms of parenting is the main 
good that is avoided when there is no child. But in the above example 
there simply is a risk of harm—because it is not certain that the ad-
opted child will ever need bone marrow—and that is a very different 
thing from actual harm. But is that so? If a dentist tells me that one of 
my teeth has suffered internal resorption, slowly destroying the 
tooth from inside, and that every week there is a 10% chance that I 
will suffer terrible pain and discomfort, I would not be satisfied to 
hear that it is just a risk of pain and suffering, even though I might 
never experience any pain related to the tooth. I would not be satis-
fied because the risk itself, at least once I am aware of it, causes me 
harm, since I could not enjoy my life normally. Similarly, someone 
putting a child up for adoption might be harmed (for instance psy-
chologically) because she might constantly be aware that the child 
could someday find her and ask for, say, a bone marrow 
transplant.14
Last, but not least, having yet another human on the planet 
would be bad for the environment, other humans, and non-human 
animals, because humans tend to over-consume limited natural re-
sources at the cost of other living things.15 The harm that every 
human inflicts on others is something that can be reduced by abor-
tion, but not by impairing the fetus. Therefore, the impairment argu-
ment fails.
4  | CONCLUSION
I have argued here that the impairment principle, although initially 
promising, cannot show that abortion is wrong. This is because there 
are goods that one can achieve by killing the fetus that one cannot 
achieve by impairing the fetus. Thus, the ceteris paribus clause in the 
second premise of the argument is not met. Therefore, I think, we 
can add the impairment principle to the list of pro-life arguments 
that are not convincing.16
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